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Once upon a time foreign money doctors roamed Latin America pre-
scribing fixed exchange rates and passive gold exchange standard mone-
tary rules. Bankers followed in their footsteps, from the halls of Monte-
zuma to the shores of Daiquiri. To the delight of local dignitaries, the
not-so-exigent financiers would yield convertible cash for IOUs. Such
normalcy during the late 1920s appeared even more attractive than that
immediately preceding the First World War. In some countries, such as
Brazil, convertibility and fixed rates appeared to have been purchased at
the price of sluggish growth; in other countries, such as Colombia, gold
standard rules permitted significant inflation. Yet most observers empha-
sized the virtues of a monetary system which minimized possible shocks
from irresponsible domestic politicians and maintained international
creditworthiness. Concern also existed in the 1920s about the weakness in
some markets for staple export products, often aggravated by rising
protectionism at the Center, but both foreign loans and the optimism of
the times made such concerns fleeting ones.
The Latin American balance of payments equilibrium of the late 1920s
was rudely and repeatedly shocked from the outside, starting in 1929 and
throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The occasional domestic earthquake,
crop failure, or indigenous madman in authority paled into insignificance
compared with the external shocks (in the case of the latter, it could often
be argued that he was an endogenous product of the disturbed external
circumstances and examples).
This paper will chronicle the major external shocks of the 1930s and
some of the ways various Latin American economies coped with them. It
will be seen that the performance of several economies was remarkably
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good, under the circumstances. This will lead us to examine the mecha-
nisms of adjustment at work during that decade, and the extent to which
they were prodded along by autonomous policy. Exchange rate develop-
ments will be examined first. This will be followed by a look at monetary
and fiscal policies, a section hobbled even more than the others by lack of
data. During the 1930s most Latin American countries performed mora-
toria on their external public debts; discussion of the causes and conse-
quences of that controversial and memorable step deserves a section of its
own. Some reflections close the paper.
1.1 Shocks and Performance
In a world of fixed exchange rates, the slowdown in the Center econo-
mies already visible in 1929 was quickly translated into a decline of export
values in the Periphery. The deepening slump plus additional protection-
ist measures at the Center, such as the U.S. Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930,
the British Abnormal Importations Act of 1931, the Ottawa Common-
wealth preferences of 1932, and similar actions by the French, German,
and Japanese empires, led to sharp declines in the Latin American terms
of trade and a milder fall of their export quantum. The purchasing power
of exports, which for countries such as Brazil and Cuba was already
declining in the late 1920s, took a sharp dive between 1928-1929 and
1932-1933, as may be seen in table 1.1 for a sample of Latin American
countries.
1 A vigorous recovery after 1932-1933 was interrupted by the
1937-1938 recession in the United States; for the decade as a whole, the
purchasing power of exports showed declines between 25 and 40 percent.
The early years of the Second World War had mixed effects on Latin
American economies: loss of European markets and shipping shortages
led to fresh export troubles in 1940 and 1941 in several countries.
While overall trends in the Center countries dominated the Latin
American export picture, the export performance of individual countries
was also marked by good or bad luck in the "commodity lottery" as well
as by attempts at export promotion and diversification, even under the
gloomy conditions of the 1930s. Examples of export gains after 1933, with
good fortune and policy efforts playing different roles, include the cases
of Peruvian and Colombian gold, Mexican silver (on which more will be
said later), Argentine corn and fruits, Brazilian cotton, and Venezuelan
oil.
As already noted, during the 1920s Latin American balance of pay-
ments were bolstered by large capital inflows, with New York replacing
1. For a closer look at the evolution of terms of trade and export quantum see Diaz
Alejandro 1980a, pp. 351-382. For Chile both the terms of trade and the export quantum
collapsed, leading to the steepest decline in the purchasing power of exports registered in
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Sources and method: Basic data, except for Cuba, obtained from CEPAL1976. Percentage
changes were computed between two-year averages. Cuban data obtained by dividing
indices of the value of exports and imports by the United States wholesale price index.
Direction General de Estadistica 1959, pp. 24-25.
London as the source of long-term portfolio funds. Direct foreign invest-
ment was also significant and began to go into manufacturing activities.
Well before Latin American countries showed signs of skipping sched-
uled servicing of the external debt, gross capital inflows fell sharply. After
1930 little fresh capital came in. With the dollar price level falling unex-
pectedly by around one-quarter between 1928-1929 and 1932-1933, debt
servicing rose dramatically in real terms, compressing the capacity to
import beyond what is suggested in table 1.1 A. As may be seen in table
LIB, the import quantum fell even more than the purchasing power of
exports between 1928-1929 and 1932-1933, except in Mexico. By 1934
all countries except Argentina, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic had
suspended normal servicing of the external national debt. From then to
the end of the decade, import volumes as a rule recovered faster than the
purchasing power of exports.
The early years of the Second World War provided a different kind of
shock to most Latin American economies: even when the foreign ex-
change was available, imports could not be obtained, either because of
strict rationing by the Allied powers or due to shipping shortages. The
more distant a country from the Allied powers, geographically and
politically, the more intense and longer lived was this supply shock; for
Argentina it could be said to have lasted well into the late 1940s, while it
was much milder and briefer for Mexico, with its overland links to the8 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro
United States, and for Cuba after the Axis submarines had been driven
from her coasts.
The emergence of a protectionist and nationalistic Center, prone to
deflation and war, was the greatest shock to Latin American economies
during the 1930s. It is true that as early as 1934 Cordell Hull, U.S.
secretary of state, started a policy of reducing U.S. tariffs, but such policy
made slow progress and had to whittle down a tariff wall raised not only
by the Smoot-Hawley Act but also by the deflation-induced increase in
the incidence of specific duties (Haberler 1976, pp. 33-34). Other major
industrialized countries retreated further into protectionism, bringing
their colonies ever more closely under their commercial and financial
"economic communities," with negative trade-diverting consequences
for sovereign Latin American countries. The memory of this betrayal of
Hume, Smith, and Ricardo would linger longer in the Periphery than in
the Center.
The open Latin American economies of the late 1920s were quite
vulnerable to this sequence of outside shocks, especially in the early
1930s. Yet bits and pieces of evidence indicate that at least some of those
economies managed to weather the storm better than the United States
and Canada. Table 1.2 presents available national accounts data for the
four largest republics. Compared to the United States, aggregate output
during 1929-1939 experienced less violent fluctuations and expanded
faster in the four Latin American countries. One should note, however,
that measurements of gross domestic product, shown in table 1.2, do not
take into account losses of real income arising from deteriorating terms of
trade. Taking these losses into account reduces Brazilian aggregate
growth during 1929-1939, for example, from 4.3 percent per annum to
3.2 percent, according to the source listed in table 1.2. For Argentina, it
may be estimated that a similar correction would reduce annual growth
from 1.6 percent to 1.2 percent per annum. On the other hand, estimates
for gross national product (not available) would show faster growth rates,
Table 1.2 Aggregate Real Output in Selected Countries, 1929-1943





































Sources and method: Data for Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico were obtained from
CEPAL 1978. Brazil data were obtained from Haddad 1978, table 1. All of these data refer
to gross domestic product at constant prices. U.S. data were obtained from U.S. Bureau of
the Census 1960, p. 139. These data refer to gross national product at constant prices.Stories of the 1930s for the 1980s
as factor payments abroad fell sharply during the 1930s, as will be seen
later.
Table 1.2 also shows an interesting contrast between U.S. and Latin
American aggregate performance during the early war years. Supply
shocks and fuller use of capacity around 1939 kept Argentine, Brazilian,
and Colombian expansion during 1939-1943 at annual rates below those
registered during 1937-1939.
It could be argued that the aggregate performance shown in table 1.2 is
far from impressive, and that the favorable contrast with the United
States is mostly explained by the larger weight of price- and income-
inelastic rural output in Latin American aggregate production. In fact,
the most impressive evidence of favorable Latin American performance
during the 1930s will not be found in aggregate data. The 1930s were a
decade of major structural changes: some sectors boomed while others
collapsed. The major leading sector was industrial output, as may be seen
in table 1.3. Here we do find a remarkable contrast between, say, Brazil-
ian and Colombian industrial growth and that of the United States;
Brazilian industrial expansion during the 1930s was also faster than that
experienced by the same country during the 1920s.
So far the term Latin America has been used loosely. Table 1.3 shows
one Latin American country whose performance was weaker and more
erratic than that of the United States. The Cuban case suggests that a
typology may be desirable; for reasons that will become clearer later on,
one may differentiate between the larger or active Latin American repub-
lics and the smaller or passive ones. While data for the latter type are
especially scarce, the conjecture is that the small or passive republics,
Table 1.3 Real Industrial Production, 1929-1943





















































Sources and method: As in table 2, except for Cuba and Uruguay. Except for Cuba, Latin
American data refer to value added by the manufacturing sector, measured at constant
prices. U.S. data refer to the Federal Reserve Board index of manufactures, given in U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1960, p. 409. Cuban data obtained from Perez Lopez 1977, p. 53.
Uruguayan data obtained from Millot, Silva, and Silva 1972, p. 251.
"Percentage change relative to 1930.
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mainly those in the Caribbean and some in Central America, were
dragged down by the U.S. performance as surely as the states of Missis-
sippi and Arkansas. Size is not the only characteristic differentiating the
two types of countries, as Cuba in the late 1920s had a domestic market
not very different from that of Uruguay or Chile, two countries whose
performance was similar to those of larger countries. Note that "small"
and "large" in this typology do not necessarily refer to the capacity of
different countries to influence their external terms of trade.
The early war years cooled the industrial boom in Argentina, Brazil,
and Colombia; not surprisingly, Mexico shows a performance during
1939-1943 in between those of the other large Latin American countries
and that of the United States.
The structural changes noted above for the economy as a whole can
also be found within the industrial sector. Even as some manufacturing
activities closely dependent on pre-1929 export-oriented prosperity were
shrinking or stagnating (examples include meat packing, flour milling,
and sugar refining), other activities, sometimes a handful, made dramatic
output advances during the 1930s. Textiles, cement, petroleum refining,
tires, pharmaceuticals, toiletries, and food processing for the home
market are examples of booming sectors. For several countries textiles
appear as quantitatively the most important leading sector, often provid-
ing more than 20 percent of the net expansion of manufacturing value
added and growing at annual rates above 10 percent. The rural sector also
witnessed a gain in the production of "importables" relative to "export-
ables."
Output growth in the booming industrial sectors far outstripped the
expansion of total domestic absorption of those manufactured goods,
which followed more closely the somewhat sluggish growth of aggregate
output. Export expansion explains little of this gap: it was import contrac-
tion, in both absolute terms and relative to domestic absorption, which
completes the picture. Import substitution, defined in its purely account-
ing sense as a decline in the ratio of imports to domestic absorption,
became the engine of growth of the 1930s, and not just in manufacturing;
several rural activities experienced trends similar to those described
above for textiles, cement, and pharmaceuticals. Such import replace-
ment, often squeezing productive capacity already installed during the
1920s, helped both to cope with balance of payments difficulties and to
maintain levels of employment; for countries such as Argentina and
Brazil there is evidence that the industrialization drive seems to have
been quite labor absorbing, with output elasticities of employment
around one.
The cement industry provides a concrete example of some aspects of
the import substitution process sketched above. Table 1.4 compares

















































































Sources and method: Basic data in physical magnitudes obtained from European Cement
Association 1967, pp. 27-43. Apparent consumption refers to cement production plus
imports less exports.
share in that absorption produced domestically. Mexico and the South
American republics, with a few exceptions, show both some increase in
total consumption and an impressive jump in the share of home produc-
tion. Public works programs in Argentina and Mexico led to especially
vigorous expansion in consumption, while the leap in the coefficient of
domestic supplies is most notable for Brazil and Colombia. The Carib-
bean islands, in contrast, present a picture as melancholy as that for
Canada and the United States. The Central American republics show no
gain in import substitution, but a surprisingly good performance in total
consumption.
1.2 Exchange Rate Policies
All Latin American countries which experienced vigorous industrial
expansion during the 1930s had, by 1932 at the latest, abandoned con-
vertibility and other gold standard rules of the game. Exchange controls
were adopted in many countries following the devaluation of the pound
sterling in September 1931. Large or active countries by 1933 had ex-
change rates relative to the dollar significantly above the late 1920s12 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro
parities, and the use of multiple exchange rates became widespread.
These measures were adopted as gold and foreign exchange reserves
dwindled or disappeared, and there was little enthusiasm in their enact-
ment; the governments viewed them as regrettable emergency opera-
tions, and there was much improvisation and confusion in their manage-
ment. Yet the governments had the good sense to reject advice, such as
that proffered by Sir Otto Niemeyer to the Brazilian government in July
1931 to adopt deflationary measures to return to convertibility at fixed
parities (de Paiva Abreu 1974, p. 15).
Small or passive countries, such as Haiti, Dominican Republic, Pan-
ama, and Cuba maintained their peg to the U.S. dollar throughout the
1930s. The last two countries did not even have a central bank or a
corresponding central monetary authority (such as those of Brazil or
pre-1935 Argentina). Exchange control measures in these small countries
were timid or nonexistent.
Regardless of the exchange rate policy followed, a country subjected to
an exogenous and permanent worsening of its international terms of
trade should witness over the long run a decline in the price of its
nontraded goods and services relative to the domestic price of importable
goods, encouraging a movement of resources toward the import-
competing sector, additional to that generated by the decline in export-
able prices. A permanent decline in net long-term capital inflows would
also induce a decline in the prices of nontraded goods relative to all
traded goods. Under a gold exchange standard with fixed rates and with
collapsing international prices for both imports and exports, nontraded
goods prices and domestic liquidity had a long way to fall. It is the
working hypothesis of this section that countries willing and able to
devalue their exchange rate moved toward the new constellation of
domestic relative prices more speedily than those with fixed rates, thus
limiting both price and monetary deflation, and containing their negative
impact on real output.
Table 1.5 shows nominal exchange rates with respect to the dollar in
the four largest Latin American countries. Starting in 1933 these data
refer to average rates relevant for imports. These is some erratic behavior
during 1932-1934 in Argentina and Brazil, countries caught in tricky
triangular relationships with the United States and the United Kingdom,
involving in different mixes unbalanced commercial and financial flows.
But the depreciating trend is clear. Like exchange controls, the deprecia-
tions were accepted by the authorities with some reluctance, and, even
after abandonment of convertibility, attempts were made to limit their
extent. Exchange rates applicable to traditional export earnings and the
purchase of foreign exchange for debt service depreciated by less than
those shown in table 1.5. Indeed, one immediate motivation for adopting
exchange controls and multiple rates was to guarantee the treasuries'13 Stories of the 1930s for the 1980s
Table 1.5 Nominal Average Import Exchange Rates, 1925-1939
(Units of Local Currency per One U.S. Dollar)
Argentina Brazil Colombia Mexico












































































Sources and method: Argentine data are given in detail in Diaz Alejandro 1980ft, p. 21.
Brazilian data obtained from Malan et al. 1977, p. 515. Colombian data obtained from
Ocampo 1980, p. 213, and from sources cited there. Mexican data obtained from Nacional
Financiera 1977, p. 216.
cheap access to the foreign exchange required to service the external
public debts. Hard-pressed treasuries also welcomed the fresh revenues
generated by the spread between high-selling and low-buying exchange
rates.
Purchasing power parity should not be expected to hold in an economy
subjected to real shocks. As may be seen in table 1.6, price levels in major
Latin American countries generally fell by less and rose by more than
United States prices during the 1930s. But the differences are small
relative to the magnitudes of exchange rate depreciation, as may be seen
directly in table 1.7. This table calculates indices of real import exchange
rates, deflating the nominal rates of table 1.5 by the price levels given in
table 1.6; comparisons are only made vis-a-vis the United States.
As the price level indices of table 1.6 have as broad a coverage of goods
and services as possible, the real exchange rates of table 1.7 can be taken
as rough proxies for the domestic price of importable goods relative to the
nontraded goods price or, alternatively, as an index of profitability in
import-substituting activities. Table 1.7 data are only proxies because
they do not take into account increments in Latin American protection,
due to either tariffs or quantitative restrictions, which occurred during
the 1930s, while using the United States GNP deflator as an indicator of





































































































Sources and method: Argentine data as in table 5; they refer to the cost of living index in the
federal capital. Brazilian data refer to an implicit GDP deflator, given in Haddad 1978, p.
166. Colombian data refer to a combination of wholesale food price indices (pre-1937) and a
cost of living index (beginning in 1937), obtained as in table 5. Mexican data refer to an
implicit GDP deflator, given in Solis 1970, pp. 104-105. U.S. data refer to the implicit GNP
deflator, given in U.S. Bureau of the Census 1960, p. 139.

















































































Sources and method: Calculated from data in tables 5 and 6, as explained in the text.15 Stories of the 1930s for the 1980s
Table 1.8 Wholesale Price Indices Relative to
Cost of Living Indices (1929 = 100)









































Sources and method: Argentine and Chilean data obtained from League of Nations 1945,
pp. 193, 197. U.S. data as in table 6.
neglect of protection underestimates the increase in the relative price of
importables, the second consideration probably contributes toward over-
estimation.
An additional bit of insight may be obtained comparing wholesale price
indices with those for the cost of living. Only two Latin American
countries have reliable series for the 1930s; those are presented in table
1.8 and contrasted with United States data. Wholesale prices cover both
importables and exportables; it is thus remarkable that for both Argen-
tina and Chile wholesale prices since 1929 fell less and rose more than the
cost of living index, a trend in marked contrast with that for the United
States. Data on money wages are very scarce for the period under
consideration; if one assumes wages followed the cost of living, the
evidence presented in table 1.8 is compatible with the hypothesis of rising
profitability in the production of tradable goods, mainly in the import-
competing sector.
2
It has already been observed that, contrary to what would happen in
many Latin American countries after the Second World War, during the
1930s both exchange rates and protectionist measures moved in the same
direction in active countries, i.e., real depreciations, tariff increases, and
import and exchange quantitative restrictions were thrown into the bal-
ance of payments battle, particularly in compressing imports. A full
discussion of commercial policies, including the complexities of bilateral
clearing arrangements imposed on the region by British and German
policies, is outside the scope of this paper. But in light of postwar policies
and controversies, it is worth noting that in the important case of Argen-
2. A look at disaggregated cost of living indices can also be revealing. In Uruguay, for
example, the clothing price index rose relative to that for foodstuffs.16 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro
tina, the real average export rate was not allowed to appreciate, in spite
of the gloomy outlook for exports (see Diaz Alejandro 1980b, pp. 2-3 for
documentation, including real rates with respect to both the U.S. dollar
and sterling). Traditional exports facing market restrictions abroad were
of course handled to avoid further price declines, but nontraditional
exports were given favorable treatment, earning the more depreciated
rates which had to be paid by importers lacking licenses. A major
architect of these policies was Raul Prebisch.
3 Modest export diversifica-
tion occurred in Argentina and in some other countries.
1.3 Monetary and Fiscal Policies
The rise of importable goods prices relative both to exportable and
nontraded goods prices, resulting from the exogenous deterioration in
the external terms of trade as well as from exchange rate and protectionist
measures, encouraged investment in import substitution. But aggregate
demand was subjected to powerful deflationary forces which could have
overwhelmed those incentives. The decline in export values signaling the
crisis was accompanied by immediate balance of payments deficits which
drained reserves and money supplies, according to gold standard rules.
The export fall had important multiplier effects. This section will examine
how those deflationary pressures on aggregate demand were contained in
active countries and eventually reversed. In countries without well-
developed financial markets it is difficult to isolate purely fiscal policies
from monetary policies. During the 1930s only Argentina had financial
markets of some sophistication, so this section will discuss aggregate
macroeconomic policies without establishing very fine distinctions be-
tween monetary and fiscal ones.
Table 1.9 presents data on money supplies. With the exception of
Cuba, Latin American countries show briefer or shallower post-1929
declines in money supplies than the United States. By 1932 Brazilian
money supply exceeded that of 1929; the corresponding Colombian date
is 1933. The end of convertibility in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and
Uruguay was helpful in stemming the loss of liquidity, while in Cuba the
inability to break out of (then) orthodox monetary rules led to a mone-
tary deflation even greater than that of the United States.
Maintenance of liquidity was not simply a matter of ending convertibil-
ity. On the one hand, even after the abandonment of the gold standard,
some countries such as Argentina shipped gold abroad to service the
external debt and sold foreign exchange to stem currency depreciation.
3. See the fascinating lectures given by Raul Prebisch in Mexico during 1944, available in
Banco Central de la Republica Argentina 1972, especially pp. 290-291. The link between
exchange rate policies and industrial expansion is explicitly made in these lectures; see













































































































Sources and method: Argentine data refer to an aggregate slightly higher than M2, obtained
from Comite National de Geografia, 1941,1943. This series follows closely the M2 of Diz
1970, p. 146, for the period of overlap. Brazilian data refer to the M2 series of Neuhaus,
1975, pp. 158-159. Colombian data refer to the Mx series presented in Banco de la
Republica 1971, pp. 104-105. Cuban data refer to the Mj series presented in Wallich, 1950,
pp. 38, 76, 152. Uruguayan data refer to the M2 series presented in Banco Central del
Uruguay, n.d. United States data refer to the M2 series presented in Friedman and Schwartz
1963, table A-l, pp. 712-716.
On the other hand, as early as 1931 South American monetary authorities
began to adopt measures which Professor E. W. Kemmerer and Sir Otto
Niemeyer would have found unsound. Thus, the Argentine Caja de
Conversion, whose old and only duty was to exchange gold for domestic
currency and vice versa, began in 1931 to issue domestic currency in
exchange for private commercial paper. By 1932 the old Caja even issued
domestic currency against treasury paper (Banco Central de la Republica
Argentina 1972, pp. 262-263). The Colombian Central Bank began in
1931 for the first time to engage in direct operations with the public,
discounting notes endorsed by two first-class corporations and lending on
the security of warehouse receipts. Government bonds were purchased in
large quantities by the Colombian Central Bank since 1932. As noted by
Robert Triffin, with the introduction of exchange control in 1931 in
Colombia, international reserves ceased to govern monetary issue,
which from then on was predominantly influenced by internal consid-
erations of economic policy or budgetary expediency (Triffin 1944a,
pp. 23-25). Very much the same could be said for all active Latin
American countries.18 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro
The then heterodox South American monetary policies, which started
around 1932, were in some ways a "relapse" into past inflationary pro-
pensities, a past which was meant to be exorcised by the adoption of gold
standard rules. Thus, the Argentine Caja relied on nearly forgotten laws
to rediscount private commercial paper; indeed, memories of wild in-
flation under inconvertible paper during the late nineteenth century,
memories still fresh during 1929-1931, hampered and slowed down the
adoption of more self-assured and expansionist monetary policies. It
should also be borne in mind that as late as the early months of 1931 there
were optimistic reports of an upturn in the major economies (Banco
Central de la Republica Argentina 1972, p. 280).
In contrast with the United States, there are no reports of widespread
bank failures in South American countries during the early 1930s. Also in
contrast with the United States, monetary aggregates fail to reveal a flight
into currency and away from bank deposits; if anything, during the early
stages of the depression the opposite appears to have occurred, as may be
seen in table 1.10. In active Latin American countries monetary author-
ities simply did not let many banks fail, casting fears of moral hazard to
the wind. While moratoria on domestic bank debts were decreed in many
countries (much earlier than in the United States), thereby freezing the
banks' assets, commercial banks were supported in a number of ad hoc
ways, not all of them conducive to maintaining actual liquidity. Thus, in
Brazil, as early as October 1930, withdrawals of bank deposits were
restricted by decree (Neuhaus 1975, p. 104). Rediscounting of private
commercial banks' loans was also vigorously carried out by central banks
and institutions such as the Banco do Brasil and the Banco de la Nation
Argentina. These and other publicly owned banks held a substantial
share of demand deposits in South America. Unorthodoxy was some-
times cloaked by gestures to the old financial orthodoxy; Argentina
claimed to have used "profits" from increases in the peso price of gold to
create an institution which supported the commercial banks (Banco
Central de la Republica Argentina 1972, p. 264).
A fairly detailed look at the budget of the Argentine central govern-
ment should cast some light on major trends in expenditures and taxes,
and on the possibilities for aggregate demand management during the
1930s. The first column in table 1.11 shows total expenditures at current
prices, which reached a low point in 1932 and expanded thereafter until
1939. Comparing nominal expenditures with the Buenos Aires cost of
living index shown in table 1.6, it may be seen that 1929 real expenditures
were surpassed even during the provisional regime of General Uriburu
(September 1930-February 1932), who had pledged an elimination of
the excesses of the populist government of President Yrigoyen. After
touching a post-1929 bottom in 1933, real expenditures expanded signifi-
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gram was undertaken by the government of General Justo (1932-1938),
himself a civil engineer, which added 30,000 kilometers of all-weather
and improved roads by 1938 to a system that had only 2,100 kilometers of
such roads in 1932 (Potash 1969, p. 85). The late 1930s also witnessed an
expansion of military expenditures.
The second column of table 1.11 compares two major injections into
the Argentine income stream: government expenditures and exports.
The latter gained relatively to the former so that by the late 1930s they
were almost of the same magnitude.
Tax revenues lagged behind expenditures during President Yrigoyen's
administration; in 1930 nominal tax revenues, heavily dependent on
import duties, fell in absolute amounts, as may be seen in table 1.12.
Large deficits were registered in 1930 and 1931, which could be regarded
as being induced by the decline in foreign trade rather than as auton-
omous acts of policy. Both the Uriburu and the Justo administrations
(and the brilliant technocrats in charge of their economic policies) took a
dim view of government deficits and made repeated pledges to correct the
situation. As in other Latin American countries fiscal heterodoxy was
discredited in Argentina by lax budgets during the late 1920s. Both the
Uriburu and the Justo administrations attempted to reduce expenditures
and to increase taxes during the early 1930s; an income tax was intro-
duced in 1932 and tariff rates were increased earlier.
During the early 1930s, budget deficits were primarily financed by
increases in the "floating debt," i.e., delays in payments to suppliers and
civil servants or payments in public debt instruments of low liquidity.
Such financing methods, of course, contributed to giving government
deficits a bad name and raised doubts about their net expansionary
effects, as they came close to forced loans. Only in the late 1930s was an
active market developed for public debt instruments. It may be seen in
table 1.11 that starting in 1932 the "floating debt" was reduced, but it is
unclear to what extent it was settled in cash or in long-term public
securities. Money supply data shown in table 1.9 suggests that the latter
was the predominant form of settlement.
Another consideration reducing the countercyclical potency of fiscal
policy during the early 1930s is the increased share in the budget of debt
service payments, mainly made to foreigners. As may be seen in table
1.11, payments on the public debt reached 29 percent of expenditures in
1932; this may be contrasted with the meager 5 percent devoted to public
works. The import content of the budget probably peaked at the worst
possible moment.
4 Other Latin American countries were to find the
4. Within the military budget, outlays for imported equipment seem to have been
reduced while those for salaries and pensions were increased (Potash 1969, pp. 74-75). But



















































































Sources and method: As in table 11.
budgetary weight of debt service an additional inducement to suspend
normal payments.
In short, there is no evidence that during the early 1930s the Argentine
government sought to increase the full employment budget deficit as a
means to compensate for the fall in aggregate demand. On the contrary,
there is evidence that attempts were made to shift the tax schedule
upward and to lower government expenditures. It may be said, however,
that even during the early 1930s the efforts to reduce the deficit induced
by the decline in foreign trade and aggregate demand were tempered by
either certain common sense or by the sheer inability to cut expenditures
and raise taxes fast enough. The relative size of public expenditures in the
income stream thus grew by default in the early 1930s, helping to sustain
economic activity. Since 1933 public expenditures expanded in a deliber-
ate way. Such an expansion had at least a balanced-budget-multiplier
effect on the rest of the economy. In addition, since 1935 the new central
bank facilitated the creation of a market for the domestic public debt,
allowing some modest deficit financing. Finally, the structure of expendi-
tures during the late 1930s favored domestic expansion, in spite of some
increase in the import content of military expenditures (Potash 1969,
p. 99).
Fiscal trends in other active Latin American countries may be briefly
contrasted with those for Argentina, using scanty or impressionistic
evidence. Calamities, civil disturbances, or border wars in the early 1930s23 Stories of the 1930s for the 1980s
led to increased public expenditures in several countries, apparently
financed directly by monetary expansion. Examples include political
turmoil in Chile during late 1931 and 1932 (when that country had a
short-lived socialist government); the war between Peru and Colombia
over Leticia in 1932; the second Chaco War between Bolivia and Para-
guay, also in 1932; the Sao Paulo rebellion of 1932 and a severe drought in
northeastern Brazil.
Brazil provides an interesting and documented example of a com-
pensatory increase in government expenditures in the early 1930s, be-
sides those resulting from the northeastern drought and the Sao Paulo
rebellion. Since 1906 Brazil had attempted to sustain coffee prices both
abroad and at home via buffer stocks. As coffee prices fell in the early
1930s, the government purchased large quantities of that product. A
good share of those purchases were financed either by foreign loans or by
new taxes, but about 35 percent appear to have been financed essentially
by money creation (Silber 1977, p. 192). The new taxes levied on exports,
or the relative exchange rate appreciation generated by foreign loans,
could be said to have improved Brazilian terms of trade, relative to the
relevant counterfactual situation (Fishlow 1972; Cardoso 1979). Argen-
tina also started regulating the production and export of major traditional
exports during the 1930s, but without the massive fiscal impact of the
Brazilian coffee purchases. The exchange differential profits shown in
table 1.12, however, were the Argentine counterpart to the Brazilian
export taxes, both attempting to raise revenues as well as to protect the
terms of trade.
Brazil, like Argentina, clearly expanded public expenditures during
the late 1930s and probably reduced the import content of those expendi-
tures even more than Argentina, as it suspended normal debt servicing in
September 1931. In 1937 Brazil announced the suspension of all debt
servicing, and none occurred during 1938 and 1939 (de Paiva Abreu 1978,
pp. 109, 119). Both Argentina and Brazil in the 1930s instituted an
important diversification of public revenues with a remarkable expansion
in noncustoms taxes, which by 1932 (Argentina) and 1933 (Brazil) had
exceeded the levels reached in 1929, at current prices. A similar trend
toward tax diversification has been reported for Colombia and Mexico
(Wallich 1944a, pp. 122-123).
Whatever the hesitations and improvisations of the early 1930s, by
the second half of the decade the active Latin American countries had
developed a respectable array of both monetary and fiscal tools, as well as
the will to use them to avoid deflation. Thus, the 1937-1938 recession in
the United States was felt in the foreign trade statistics much more than in
those for industrial output. South American countries damaged by the
loss of European markets and shipping shortages in 1940 mobilized to
adopt emergency stabilization measures, such as the Plan Pinedo in24 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro
Argentina (Diaz Alejandro 1970, p. 105). Soon thereafter, however,
fiscal and monetary tools had to go into reverse gear to offset inflationary
pressures arising from expanding foreign exchange reserves and supply
shortages. That transition was not managed smoothly, perhaps with the
exception of pre-1944 Argentina,
5 but that is another story.
The impotency of passive countries may be illustrated by the contrast-
ing experiences of Cuba and Mexico in their tinkering with silver for
monetary and fiscal purposes during the early 1930s. Both countries hit
upon the expedient of issuing silver coins, which both added to liquidity
and yielded seigniorage "profits" to the treasury, justifying expenditures.
In Cuba modest issues were made during 1932-1933, and in 1934 a
revolutionary government appeared to herald a bold new monetary
system independent of the dollar by planning new issues and by making
silver pesos full legal tender for the discharge of old as well as new
obligations contracted in dollars or in old Cuban gold pesos. Shortly
thereafter a mild form of exchange control was decreed. Foreign banks
apparently threatened to export all dollars from Cuba; capital flight
followed. The government caved in, lifting rather than expanding con-
trols. Only the legal tender status of silver for all contracts in such
currency remained of the 1934 reform. Even a central bank was not
established until 1948 (Wallich 19446, pp. 351-352).
Mexico, after some deflationary measures in 1930 and 1931, adopted a
series of expansionary monetary and fiscal steps early in 1932, relying
mainly on issues of silver pesos.
6 Central bank control over commercial
banks was extended and strengthened. Foreign banks threatened to leave
Mexico, and as the Mexican authorities held firm, most of them actually
did. Mexican-owned commercial banks took their place. These and other
policies, framed under the remarkable leadership of Alberto J. Pani,
contributed to the vigorous recovery of the Mexican economy. Mexican
reliance on a silver standard did not generate unmanageable problems
when the United States raised silver prices; Mexico simply prohibited the
export of silver money in April 1935 and ordered all coins to be ex-
changed for paper currency. A year and a half later, after the world price
of silver had fallen, silver coinage was restored (Friedman and Schwartz
1963, p. 491). As a major producer and exporter of silver, Mexico of
5. In an article published in 1944, Robert Triffin asserted: "In the short period since 1935
the Central Bank of Argentina has developed into an outstanding institution among central
banks not only in Latin America but in older countries as well. Credit for this achievement is
due largely to the brilliant leadership of Raoul [sic] Prebisch, general manager of the bank
during most of this period, and to an extremely able staff of executives and research
workers" (Triffin 19446, pp. 100-101).
6. For Mexico, I shamelessly follow the unpublished works of two young Mexican
scholars, who happen to be graduate students at Yale: Enrique Cardenas and Jaime
Zabludowsky. My summary of their research does not do full justice to their papers. I am
grateful for their permission to use their work.25 Stories of the 1930s for the 1980s
course benefited from higher international silver prices, which acceler-
ated her recovery. The Mexican case was in this respect different from the
disastrous Chinese experience (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, pp. 699-
700; contrast with the slip in Haberler 1976, p. 10).
1.4 The Service of Foreign Capital
Before the First World War, portfolio and direct investments, mainly
from Europe, flowed into Latin America. Those from the United States
were then relatively small and concentrated in the Caribbean, Central
America, and Mexico. During the 1920s, U.S. investments soared
throughout the region, while European investments stagnated or de-
clined. The expansion of public borrowing in the New York bond market
was particularly noteworthy.
Table 1.13 presents estimates of the stock of British and U.S. invest-
ments of all kinds in Latin America toward the end of the 1920s. In per
capita terms they remained below corresponding figures for Canada, but
impressive levels were registered in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Costa
Rica, Mexico, and especially Cuba. Both in Canada and Latin America
the two major foreign investors had accumulated a stock of claims around
four times the value of annual merchandise exports. Assuming a 5 per-
cent rate of return, profits and interests of foreign capital must have
accounted for about 20 percent of annual export earnings.
Relations with foreign investors had remained prickly throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Defaults had occurred on
bonds issued in London, and numerous frictions were generated by direct
investments. The Royal Navy was no stranger to South American waters,
once even attempting a naval blockade of Bolivia, and the U.S. Marines
were an important presence in the Caribbean and in Central America.
During the 1920s, however, the investment climate appeared reasonably
good, with the exception of Mexico. The continuous tensions between
Mexico and the United States over oil and other U.S. investments led a
perceptive observer to worry about "the conflict between the vested
rights of Americans in the natural resources of the Caribbean countries
and the rising nationalism of their peoples" (Lippmann 1927, p. 353).
7
These long-term considerations were overwhelmed after 1929 by short-
term budgetary and balance of payments difficulties in servicing foreign
7. While adopting a paternalistic tone, highly offensive today ("One persistent motive in
these uprisings is the desire to assert the national independence and the dignity of an inferior
race".), Lippmann concluded with words which could be read with profit more than half a
century later in the United States State Department: "And nothing would be so certain to
arouse still further this illwill as the realization in Latin America that the United States had
adopted a policy, conceived in the spirit of Metternich, which would attempt to guarantee
vested rights against social progress as the Latin peoples conceive it" (Lippmann 1927,
pp. 357, 363).26 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro
Table 1.13 Ratio of Stock of all British plus U.S. Investments to Annual
Merchandise Exports and Population, circa Late 1920s
Stock of Investments Investments per Capita




































































Sources and method: For Latin American countries basic data come from Winkler [1928]
1971, pp. 276,278,283. Export data refer to 1927, while those for investments are said to be
for 1929 (forecasts?). Canadian data obtained from Urquhart and Buckley 1965, pp. 14,
169, 173. Canadian data refer to 1926 and cover direct and portfolio investments from all
sources.
capital. The unexpected fall in dollar prices sharply increased the real
cost of external obligations denominated in nominal terms. Protection
and depression abroad cut into exchange earnings, actual and potential.
While much of the external debt of those days was long-term, it still called
for some amortizations. The drying up of foreign capital markets after
1930 made rollover operations for both long- and short-term debt very
difficult. The collapse of import duty revenues cut a traditional budgetary
source for payments on the external debt.
Table 1.14 shows estimates of the ratio of long-term external public
debt to annual exports, both in current dollars. A steep increase occurred
between 1929 and 1935 because of the fall in exports. More complete data
are available for Argentina and Brazil; these are presented in table 1.15,
which also gives Canadian data. By 1931 all net profits and interests on
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Sources and method: Data for 1929 through 1945 obtained from CEPAL 1964, pp. 24, 27.
Data since 1972 obtained from Inter-American Development Bank 1980, pp-. 431,443. The
coverage of Latin America differs between these two sources; such a difference,- however, is
unlikely to modify the broad trend shown above.
Brazil, and 27 percent in Argentina. All public debt services (including
amortizations) reached 38 percent of exports in Brazil and over 15
percent in Argentina. It was seen in table 1.11 that debt service reached
22 percent of Argentine government expenditures in 1931. Chile in 1932
faced interest and amortization charges, including those on short-term
maturities, far exceeding export earnings (Wallich 1943, p. 321).
Starting late in 1931, exchange control authorities delayed issuing
permits to foreign companies for remitting profits abroad. Such profits
had also been reduced by the crisis. More drastically, and also starting in
1931, most Latin American countries suspended normal payments on
their external debts and asked foreign creditors for conversations aimed
at rescheduling and restructuring those debts. Those negotiations were to
stretch well into the 1940s, and in some cases into the 1950s. Different
countries carried out the conversations with various degrees of enthu-
siasm; Cuba, for example, while servicing her debt irregularly during the
1930s, maintained better relations with her creditors than Brazil, whose
dealings with creditors during the late 1930s, especially with the British,
were acrimonious.
Rescheduling and liquidations of European-held debt plus the recov-
ery of international trade had lowered sharply the debt/export ratio by
1945, as may be seen in table 1.14, a trend which probably continued until
the early 1960s. Even in Argentina and Canada, which maintained nor-
mal debt service during the 1930s, profits and interests relative to export
tended to decline in the late 1930s and early 1940s, as may be seen in table
1.15. For Latin America as a whole, interests plus profits as a percentage
of all export earnings were down to 7 percent in the early 1950s; only
during the 1970s were these indicators to reach again the levels of the late
1920s (Bacha and Diaz Alejandro 1981, table 7).
The contrast between Argentine and Brazilian policies toward debt
service in the 1930s reveals the nature of international economic relations
during those years. (The punctual debt servicing by the Dominican
Republic and Haiti presents no mystery: the U.S. Marines stationed in





















Argentine and Brazilian Financial Remittances






































































































Sources and method: Pre-1944 Argentine data obtained from CEPAL 1956, table 18,
p. 293. Pre-1944 Brazilian data obtained from de Paiva Abreu 1980, tables 1 and 2. Data
since 1973 for both countries obtained from World Bank 1980, vol. 2; International
Monetary Fund 1980a, 19806. Pre-1944 Canadian data obtained from Urquhart and Buck-
ley 1965, pp. 159-160. Data since 1973 obtained as above.
"Include both interest and amortization. To obtain Brazilian data before 1944 it was
assumed that amortization amounted to 40 percent of all public debt services.
bInclude both private and public net profit and interest remittances.
cRefers to 1911-1915.
merchandise accounts, Brazil traditionally had an export surplus with the
United States and an import surplus with the United Kingdom. Argen-
tina had an export surplus with the United Kingdom, and an import
surplus with the United States. Both the Argentine and Brazilian debts
had become diversified during the 1920s, but more than half were still
held by British interests.
Argentina had an export surplus with a country organizing common-
wealth preferences and threatening to impose bilateral exchange clear-
ings, and where the financial interests of the city still exerted great
political influence. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand appeared eager
to replace Argentina in British markets. British pressures culminated in
the Roca-Runciman treaty of 1933, whose features were not unlike those
of 1930s economic treaties between Germany and eastern European29 Stories of the 1930s for the 1980s
countries. The bitterness felt both in Argentina and in the United States
toward this treaty is aptly summarized in a long rhetorical question of
Virgil Salera: "But could not more far-sighted [Argentine] leadership
have avoided the granting of thoroughgoing preferences of the sort that
were actually conceded under the terms of the Roca pact, concessions
which, besides encouraging international ill-will in the case of those
countries discriminated against, reduced Argentina to something close to
an economic vassal of a power that had never preached nor practiced
universal narrow bilateralism as a new and more satisfactory type of
international economic policy?" (Salera 1941, p. 89). Under these cir-
cumstances, tampering with the normal servicing of the Argentine debt
would have involved not only a bruising commercial clash with the
United Kingdom, but also probably a major restructuring of the Argen-
tine domestic political scene, at the expense of groups linked with Anglo-
Argentine trade.
Brazil had an export surplus with a country committed to multilateral
trade plus convertibility, and where the New Deal viewed financial
interests with some suspicion. United States exporters to Brazil know
that an additional dollar spent in Rio for debt servicing, mainly to British
interests, would mean one less dollar for Brazilian imports from the
United States (Brazil had run out of reserves as early as 1930). The
British could do little when faced by erratic Brazilian debt service.
Furthermore, during the second half of the 1930s there was a preoccupa-
tion in Washington with German influence in Brazil, leading to even
more tolerant views of Brazilian debt service irregularities (de Paiva
Abreu 1978). Similar geopolitical considerations may also explain the
relatively mild response of the Roosevelt administration to the Mexican
oil nationalizations of 1938.
International capital markets never quite recovered from the 1930s
defaults. Such an experience, particularly that involving nonindustrial
countries, is still used to buttress arguments favoring the organization of
sanctions against possible defaults by less developed countries during the
1980s (Eaton and Gersovitz 1980, pp. 7-9, 53). Without heavy penalties
on defaults, it is argued, international capital markets will mobilize too
few funds, as bankers ration credit to offset the adverse selection im-
perfection. As there are no more recent examples of widespread defaults
than those of the 1930s, it is important to inquire whether the defaults
resulted mainly from virtual impossibility to pay and from unexpected
changes in international rules, or whether debtor countries coolly broke
their contracts because they calculated that they could get away with it
because of the lack of sanctions.
Writing in The American Economic Review for 1943, Henry C. Wallich
argued that, at least for Latin American dollar bonds, the causes of
default were well-known and deserved little elaboration: "If the depres-30 Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro
sion of the 1930's had been mild, and if the steady expansion of world
trade and capital exports had continued thereafter, defaults probably
would have been infrequent and could have been settled without much
difficulty. . . . Without . . . attempting to deny that insufficient care was
exercised, and that Latin American countries were encouraged to borrow
excessively one may question whether these factors were decisive" (Wal-
lich 1943, p. 321).
Other commentators of the 1930s and 1940s emphasized that imperfec-
tions in the 1920s capital markets did not derive solely from the inability
of honest and competent bankers and underwriters to tell which borrow-
ers really planned to service their debts, independently of their financial
positions. Many underwriters were accused not only of negligence in
seeking information about borrowers and their projects, but also of
deliberately misleading the proverbial widows and orphans (Winkler
1932; Cumberland 1932). Much New Deal legislation sought to check
dishonesty in financial intermediation.
The crisis of the 1930s went beyond macroeconomic collapse and the
protectionist upsurge. The industrialized countries themselves led in the
undermining of belief in the sanctity of contracts; examples include the
British default on the war debt, Germany's failure to make payments on
the greater part of her international obligations, and the derogation of
the gold clause in the United States (Wallich 1943, p. 322). During the
1940s the United Kingdom froze growing sterling balances of many
developing countries, balances whose real value was sharply eroded by
inflation, and actually contemplated complete repudiation. A substantial
body of British economic opinion even today regrets that repudiation was
not adopted (Bolton 1972).
By the late 1930s the ability to service their debts had improved in
many Latin American countries, and indeed some servicing did occur
throughout the 1930s. There were gains to be made avoiding repudiation,
even in the absence of Eaton-Gersovitz sanctions. Some countries pur-
chased their own partially or wholly unserviced bonds, which were selling
at a discount in foreign markets. This was regarded by some as perfidious:
you default, ruin the prices of your bonds, and then quietly buy them
back. As late as 1943, Henry Wallich argued that such repurchases were
not only defensible but, under the circumstances, constituted the best
method of dealing with the defaulted bonds "not merely from the view-
point of the debtor but to some extent even from that of the bondholder"
(Wallich 1943, p. 332).
The repurchase, Wallich argued, avoided a rigid settlement at a time
when the international economic outlook was very uncertain. Repur-
chases had a technical advantage which today seems archaic: they could
be carried out by central banks, whose exchange reserves were rising in
the early 1940s, while normal servicing was the responsibility of treasur-31 Stories of the 1930s for the 1980s
ies, whose revenue situation had been hurt by the fall in imports and the
corresponding decline in duties. Wallich noted that by the late 1930s and
early 1940s the defaulted Latin American bonds had become unsuitable
for the portfolios of their original holders, so it could be assumed that a
large part was held by speculators. This consideration, plus the mac-
roeconomic advantages derived by the United States from capital exports
during the 1920s, plus the irregularities found on both sides in many loan
transactions, made the ethics of resuming debt service highly problem-
atical. The early use of Keynesian analysis led Wallich to write, some-
what tongue-in-cheek: " 'Tis better to have lent and lost than never to
have lent at all" (Wallich 1943, p. 328). He recommended a generous
policy toward the debtors, without a hint of new codes for sanction-
ing defaults. Indeed, he suggested that the service of loans which the
EXIMBANK began to extend to Latin American countries in 1940
should be made contingent on the exports of each country.
Regardless of the ethics and legalities of defaults, the economics of the
1930s induce tolerance. What Gottfried Haberler has written justifying
the suspension of German reparations applies a fortiori to Latin Amer-
ican defaults: "... when productive resources were allowed to go to
waste in idleness and countries everywhere were restricting imports to
protect jobs, it made no economic sense whatsoever to insist on the
transfer of real resources as reparations" (Haberler 1976, p. 28). Repara-
tions, like debt service, were fundamentally victims of the Great Depres-
sion: "... there can be hardly a doubt that the transfer of the reparations
as fixed by the Young plan would have been possible—in the absence, to
repeat, of a serious depression and depression-induced protectionism"
(Haberier 1976, p. 31).
1.5 Concluding Reflections
For most Latin American countries, the 1930s and early 1940s were
"the worst of times and the best of times." After the initial external
blows, the active countries steadily gained in both ability and will to
maintain growth regardless of foreign conditions. The public sector
undertook new development tasks, while the national private sector
seems to have experienced an upsurge. Countries learned to rely on
domestic finance for capital formation and to do without many imports.
Import substitution extended to economic policy: gone were Kemmerer,
Niemeyer, and Fisher,
8 their places partly taken by Prebisch and Pani,
8. Kemmerer's prestige in the United States and in Latin America seems to have peaked
in the late 1920s. For a summary of his views see his presidential address to the American
Economic Association (Kemmerer 1927). Irving Fisher advised the Calles government in
Mexico during the early 1930s, but the nature of his advice is unknown (Suarez 1977,
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and partly by new "imports" such as Triffin and Wallich. Domestic
economic policy witnessed a most creative period, encouraged by the new
foreign advisors. Thus Triffin defended Latin American exchange con-
trols (Triffin 1944b, pp. 112-113) and advised Paraguay to peg to a basket
of currencies (Triffin 1944c, pp. 6-7). Latin American experiences
sparked further insights in the late 1940s: Polak outlined the "absorption
approach" in a paper written in connection with Mexico's 1948 devalua-
tion (Polak 1948). Polak has also noted, in private conversation, that the
early development of the monetary approach to the balance of payments
was heavily influenced by Rodrigo Gomez and his staff at the Central
Bank of Mexico.
Policies which made sense during 1929-1945 turned out not to be so
desirable after the Second World War. Some countries adapted to the
more prosperous and peaceful international economic conditions fairly
quickly, while others remained obsessed by export pessimism and fears of
unemployment and of a new world war. Thus, while Mexico sought new
sources of foreign exchange and achieved price stability by the 1950s,
Argentina and Brazil remained tangled in extreme protectionism and
inflation. To what extent the Argentine and Brazilian policy errors of the
1950s were inevitable consequences of the 1930s is highly questionable
and beyond the scope of this paper.
To conclude, two lessons of the 1930s seem particularly relevant for the
1980s. In a world of erratic changes in terms of trade, unpredictable
protectionism, and high capital mobility, commitment to fixed exchange
rates, unlimited convertibility, and gold-standard-type monetary rules
seems rash and risky. The second lesson applies to creditor countries. If
by their actions they seriously disturb the normal expectations existing at
the time loans were made, they may destroy the reverse transfer mecha-
nism. Such a lesson would apply either to old or new capital exporters,
and unusual actions would include protectionism, the tolerance of pro-
longed depression, or extravagant increases in oil prices or interest rates.
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Comment Miguel Mancera
The title of the document presented by Diaz Alejandro, "Stories of the
1930s for the 1980s," is in itself very appealing. Economic policies for the
future are always based to a large extent on the experience of the past. In
this sense, the review the author makes not only of the 1930s, but of the
end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1940s—along with occasional
observations of other periods—proves most useful. The review of these
conjunctures has the additional interest of referring to a time not experi-
enced by the majority of today's population, including those who are now
economists. However, it was a time which should be better known since
the then prevailing circumstances spurred a significant advance in the
science of economics and also, as Diaz Alejandro points out, a profound
change in the economies of some Latin American countries.
As the author recalls, two major blows were received from abroad by
the Latin American economies during the 1930s. On the one hand, there
was the decline in demand for their exports due to both recession and
protectionist policies at the center, and on the other, there was the great
increase in the burden of servicing the foreign debt, due as much to the
rise in the real rate of interest in certain years, as to the fact that it was
virtually impossible to negotiate new loans with which to make the usual
rollover.
One of the most interesting results derived from the drop in Latin
American exports was that the countries which the author calls "active"
abandoned the system of fixed exchange rates.
It is likely that the system of fixed exchange rates ceased to be the rule
in the 1930s not so much because many were convinced of the compara-
tive advantages of a more flexible system, but because it was practically
unfeasible to maintain the previous parities with respect to gold. Some
monetary authorities probably hoped to attain a new stability in exchange
rates, if only at a different level than before and not necessarily in terms
of gold, but in terms of a new standard that, in practice, became the U.S.
dollar.
Whatever the reasons or aspirations were when the currencies of active
countries declined in value, something very important was expediently
achieved to bring about a profound structural change in the economies of
these countries. In so doing, the crisis, as Diaz Alejandro says, was
absorbed with less negative impacts on both employment and growth.
What was actually achieved with the Latin American devaluations of
the 1930s—that, most likely, remains in the subconscious of many but is
rarely admitted because it is unpleasant to confess—was the reduction in
real wages. This reduction, accomplished with such expediency through
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exchange measures, would have been much slower, if at all possible,
maintaining a fixed exchange rate and trying to lower nominal wages.
Obviously, the reduction in real wages made import-substituting indus-
tries and those with a nontraditional export potential more profitable.
The hypothesis could then be established that, by means of devaluation,
the crisis implied less penalties for the populations of active countries,
since the negative impact of the reduction in wages on the working
population was probably less than that which would have been caused by
the resulting contraction in employment had the exchange rate been
maintained. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of social fairness, perhaps
a certain reduction in the income of many is better than maintaining the
income level of some while causing the unemployment of others.
In discussing the exchange measures taken in the 1930s by active
countries, a distinction should be made between the effects of outright
devaluation and of establishing exchange controls, with or without de-
valuation. The virtues of devaluation in the 1930s have already been
discussed.
Exchange controls are sometimes established to avoid capital flight.
Naturally, for such controls to be effective, the monetary authority must
succeed in making residents surrender all foreign exchange they receive
for whatever reason. This assumes the existence of an extensive and
costly administrative apparatus not only in the central bank, but also in
commercial banks and in customs. Such an apparatus requires numerous
and highly qualified personnel. They should be uncorruptible and always
up-to-date on the prices of a wide variety of goods that are imported and
exported. They must be familiar with the mechanisms for transferring
funds and with the usual payment terms in foreign trade operations, as
well as with the nature and conditions of international financial transac-
tions.
What the exchange controls established in Latin America during the
1930s were able to achieve to avoid capital flight, no one can know for
certain. It is reasonable to assume, however, that, given the great dif-
ficulty and the length of time necessary to set up an effective exchange
control, enormous capital outflows did occur despite existing controls,
mostly during the initial years (the controls themselves could have been
an additional reason for the outflows). It may not be absurd to think, even
though no one can prove or disprove it, that more capital flight has taken
place over the years under exchange controls than under free converti-
bility.
Exchange controls can be established not only with the aim of control-
ling capital movements, but as an instrument for rationing the foreign
exchange needed for current transactions—an alternative to devaluation,
especially when there is not enough political courage to undertake it. If
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valued and it will be harder to bring about the desirable structural
changes in the economy. In addition, since the price of foreign currency is
not in equilibrium, monetary authorities must resolve the tremendous
problem of suitably distributing the insufficient foreign exchange they
have at their disposal. Monetary authorities become exposed to the risk
of making serious errors in judgment when deciding how to distribute the
foreign currency at hand, while many officers and employees of banking
institutions and of customs become vulnerable to corruption.
In time, exchange controls—originally established to avoid capital
flight or devaluation—may also be used to wield influence on the struc-
ture of international transactions through multiple exchange rates. In this
respect, however, it is doubtful that exchange controls accomplish any-
thing that could not be achieved with free convertibility, properly com-
bined with import and export duties.
Much has been written about exchange controls, and this paper cannot
discuss the subject in depth. But these brief remarks are needed, since the
author seems inclined to suggest exchange controls in lieu of a system of
flexible exchange rates and free convertibility.
One more word about the then heterodox devaluations of the 1930s.
Besides being responsible for a profound and desirable structural change
in the economies of the active countries, the devaluations served as an
antirecessionary element. By partially or totally offsetting the decline in
domestic prices brought about by the drop in exports, devaluations
caused real interest rates not to rise as much as they would have in certain
years had such policies not been implemented.
The monetary and fiscal management of the 1930s is the object of a
stimulating analysis on the part of Diaz Alejandro. The author points to
the successes of the compensatory measures of active countries. One of
the reasons for the success of these measures was that they were applied
without excess, at least in the beginning. The annual increases in public
spending and the money supply were within a range that today would
correspond to rather conservative programs in most of Latin America.
It was not until the last years of the 1930s and the early 1940s when
macroeconomic policies moved from compensatory to expansionary.
The new theories of Keynes began to permeate Latin America and were
cited as an endorsement for incurring fiscal deficits of a magnitude that
would hardly have been approved by such an intelligent economist.
In connection with the Latin American foreign debt in the 1930s, it is
possible to say—as does the author—that the problem stemmed much
more from the external situation than from domestic difficulties. The rise
in the real burden of servicing the debt was doubtless a serious matter.
But perhaps even a greater one was the collapse of international financial
markets. In this respect, it should be remembered that highly indebted
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percentages of their international obligations on time if those that they
settle can be replaced by others. If the possibility of rollover is closed to
them, so is the possibility to pay on time. This should be kept in mind by
those who take out credit, but even more so by those who offer it.
Lenders actually have a two-fold responsibility: to maintain the possibil-
ity of rollover and, at the same time, not to induce prospective debtors—
as lenders paradoxically often do—to take more credit than can realisti-
cally be paid or replaced at maturity.
In his final reflections, Diaz Alejandro states, with good reason, that
the policies that made sense in the 1930s were no longer desirable after
World War II.
One might ask whether the lessons of the 1930s are appropriate for the
1980s. The answer surely is in the affirmative, but only in the general
context that all experiences leave usable lessons for the future. The
1980s, however, find countries within Latin America in a wide variety of
circumstances.
Some Latin American countries, especially the non-oil-producing
ones, have received blows from abroad that are somehow equivalent to
those of the 1930s; the difference being that, generally, the new problems
are due much more to the rise in the price of oil imports than to the
decline in the value of exports.
Needless to say, for those Latin American countries that are oil pro-
ducers, the present situation differs tremendously from that of a half
century ago.
But, apart from the peculiarities of each country, the general economic
framework of the 1980s is radically different from the 1930s. This is true
inside as well as outside Latin America. Take, for example, the case of
international credit. Financial markets, especially the Euromarket, are
extremely active and liquid nowadays. The majority of Latin American
countries have been able to increase the amount of their foreign debt or,
at least, to maintain it. It would be hard to find cases of countries that
have to make net payments on foreign credit.
Besides, interest on foreign debt, taken in real terms, has tended to be
low during the last years and, at times, has turned out negative. Only
during short periods, like some recent ones, has it been necessary to pay
high real interest rates.
The relative ease with which many Latin American countries have
been able to increase their foreign debt during the last ten of fifteen years
has determined that, contrary to the 1930s, international financial trans-
actions, taken by themselves, now constitute a very important inflation-
ary element.
There are also sharp differences with regard to the openness of the
economy. Beginning in the 1930s, an increasingly protectionist trend has
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been signs of change in recent years. But in spite of these signs, the levels
of protection prevailing in many countries would have been inconceiv-
able a half century ago. This excessive protection has curbed the develop-
ment of existing or potential export industries whose inputs of domestic
origin are frequently very costly according to international standards. In
this context, there seems to be a case for applying policies inverse to those
of the 1930s, namely, less and not more protection.
How does the fiscal and monetary picture of the 1980s compare to the
1930s? A half century ago it made sense to battle recessionary forces of
external origin with policies of a Keynesian cut. Today, the situation is
entirely different in most countries. There is demand-pulled inflation
stemming from substantial fiscal deficits financed with net credit from the
central bank and with resources from abroad.
In some cases, such deficits began precisely at the wrong time, during
years in which international markets were booming and the demand for
exports was enormous. It is hard to explain how this could happen. But,
whatever the reason was, the outcome has been unfortunate. Inflation,
which at the start was only demand-pulled, built itself into the economy
and became cost-pushed as well—an element that did not exist in the
1930s and which makes the return to stability much more difficult.
One clear example of the building of inflation into the economy is the
indexation of wages in a good number of countries. This, of course,
renders some instruments of economic policy—like devaluation—in-
effective or less effective, whereas in the 1930s they were a good expe-
dient to achieve needed adjustments.
The author concludes his paper with two sets of morals:
Addressing creditor countries, he states, "If by their actions they
seriously disturb the normal expectations existing at the time loans were
made, they may destroy the reverse transfer mechanism." Among the
possible actions of this nature, he cites protectionism, tolerance of pro-
longed depression, and extravagant increases in interest rates or oil
prices. Surely, the majority of economists would agree with the author in
this respect.
The moral addressed to Latin American countries is rather unex-
pected: "Commitment to fixed exchange rates, unlimited convertibility,
and gold-standard-type monetary rules seems rash and risky." Since most
of present Latin America hardly needs further persuasion to act against
such rules, the moral is surprising indeed.
Perhaps the moral that would serve the region best might be one
underlying the need to avoid the use of prescriptions which are, precisely,
at the opposite extreme from the painful and irrational rules of the gold
standard.